Quantum Private Comparison (QPC) allows us to protect private information during its comparison. In the past various three-party quantum protocols have been proposed that work well under certain attacks. Here we tackle the problem of QPC under noise. We analyze the EPR based protocol under depolarizing noise, bit flip and phase flip noise. We show how noise affects the robustness of the the EPR based protocol. We then present our protocol based on CSS codes to perform Quantum Private Comparison which is robust against noise and secure under general attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum ideas have led to surprising developments in the field of secure communication. The most startling example is that of cryptography, where quantum ideas have revolutionized the field. While most classical cryptography schemes depend on computational complexity for their security, quantum cryptographic schemes [1] [2] [3] [4] offer security based on physical laws. There have been further developments such as quantum secure direct communication [5] [6] [7] , quantum secret sharing [8] [9] [10] , quantum authentication and signature [11] [12] [13] [14] .
Secure multi-party computation allows [15] several distrustful parties to jointly compute a function while keeping their inputs private, and is of fundamental importance in secure communication. A particular instance is to compute the equality function with just two parties. Quantum Private Comparison (QPC) aims to do the above computation without sharing the party's private information. This is in contrast to quantum key distribution (QKD) which provides a secure way to share private information.
Let Alice and Bob have private information M A and M B respectively. QPC involves the computation of the function f (M A , M B ) such that
Furthermore, at the end of the protocol Alice and Bob do not wish the other party to learn anything about their information, apart from what can be inferred logically from f (M A , M B ). Lo [16] pointed out that the above function f (M A , M B ) cannot be computed securely by two parties alone. Hence a third party is needed to facilitate the process. One might think that a three-party QPC is * vsiddhu@andrew.cmu.edu † arvind@iisermohali.ac.in trivial. Both Alice and Bob can convey their information to a trusted third party (Charlie) and he can tell Alice and Bob the outcome of the function f . The problem here is a little different; Alice and Bob do not wish to disclose their information to anyone, including Charlie and yet wish to compare their private information. In fact, they do not want to transmit the information at all. For our purpose we assume that (a) Charlie tries to learn information about Alice and Bob's input while being restricted to faithfully follow the protocol. In other words he is semi-honest or honest but curious.
(b) Charlie may know the positions at which M A and M B differ, but not the actual bit values.
In the past several three-party quantum protocols have been proposed [17] [18] [19] [20] . These protocols assume that all channels are noiseless. It is hard to build perfect quantum channels and hence we must build protocols that are robust against noise. We choose a specific protocol [19] and add noise to its channels. We consider depolarizing noise, bit flip and phase flip noise. We show that the protocol is not robust under noise. We note that three-party QPC involves transmission of correlated keys between the parties, and that under noise these correlations are altered. Quantum error correction helps overcome the effects of noise. We note that quantum error correction and quantum cryptography have a deep connection [21] .
Exploiting this connection, we use the CSS quantum error correction scheme [22] to transmit correlated keys to relevant parties under noisy conditions in a secure manner. This allows us to perform three-party QPC under noisy conditions.
II. EPR-BASED QPC PROTOCOL AND NOISE
help of a semi-honest third party called Charlie. Let Alice, Bob and Charlie be connected by noiseless quantum channels that can be eavesdropped upon and classical channels that can be eavesdropped upon but not altered. For each qubit, we consider the computational basis |0 and |1 and define the rotated basis state as
). For pairs of qubits the four Bell states are defined as
Using these resources over the quantum channels and classical communication over the classical channels the secure QPC protocol proceeds as follows: Protocol 1.
1. Charlie prepares a random n bit string C T . For each bit of C T he prepares a quantum state. If the bit is 0 then he prepares one of the states from |φ ± (it does not matter which). Otherwise, he prepares one of the states from |ψ ± . Sequence T A consists of the first half of each of these entangled pairs, while T B consists of the second halves. 4. Alice and Bob measure the decoys in the appropriate basis and consult over a classical channel to check for eavesdroppers. If the error rate is more than a predetermined rate then they abort the protocol, else they proceed.
5. Alice and Bob measure the non-decoy particles in the Z basis to obtain bit strings R A and R B respectively. Note that each of R A and R B are uniformly random while R A ⊕ R B = C T .
Alice and Bob calculate C
They cooperate to calculate C = C A ⊕ C B and send it to Charlie. It is not hard to see that in the absence of noise and eavesdropping the protocol computes the function f (M A , M B ) with certainty. We note that if an eavesdropper (Eve) passes undetected then the output of the protocol can be different from f (M A , M B ) because Eve can tamper the non-decoy particles (she may cause R A ⊕ R B = C T ) and make the protocol malfunction. It has been shown that the above protocol is secure against certain insider and outsider attacks [19] and hence computes f (M A , M B ) with very high probability.
A. One qubit noisy channels
In the QPC protocol described above, perfect (noiseless) single qubit quantum channels between Alice, Bob and Charlie have been employed. In any real situation, the noise can act on these channels in a number of ways. Therefore, we need to consider noisy one qubit channels instead of noiseless channels and explore the possibility of carrying out QPC over these noisy channels. We begin by describing the noisy channels and then figure out their effect on the EPR-based QPC protocol.
The bit flip channel with error probability 1 − p is defined through its action on a one qubit density operator ρ via the action of the bit flip gate X as
Similarly, the phase flip channel with error probability 1 − p is described through the action of the phase flip gate Z as
The depolarizing channel with error probability p is
The above equation admits the interpretation that the state is acted upon by each Pauli operator with probability p 3 and remains unchanged with probability 1 − p.
B. QPC and depolarizing channels
Let both the channels between Alice and Charlie (AC) and between Bob and Charlie (BC) suffer from depolarizing noise. If the error represented by the Pauli matrix σ A acts on the AC channel and the error represented by σ B affects the BC channel then we call the combined error σ A σ B . From equation (5) we see that under depolarizing noise the channel acts such that each Pauli matrix acts on the qubit with equal probability p 3 . Since both the channels AC and BC are independent the errors act independently. Hence, the probability for an X A X B error is
If an error acts such that it takes the state |φ ± to the state |ψ ± or vice-versa then the protocol will return an incorrect answer. This happens because the flipping of a correlated to an anti-correlated state and vice-versa makes the string C T an unfaithful record of the positions at which R A and R B differ. After the error has acted C T = C T where
Under the action of depolarizing noise mentioned in equation (5) the probability that the state changes from |φ ± to |ψ ± or vice-versa is r = 4p
3 ), which means that the probability that C T and C T differ at a given position is r. Even if there is a difference at single position in C T and C T then the protocol will give wrong results. Let n be the length of the strings and P (C T = C T ) the probability that C T = C T . It is straightforward to see that
Hence the protocol [19] is not robust against any amount of depolarizing noise. For large n and small r, the error is linear in r.
C. Bit and Phase Flip channels and QPC
Consider bit flip and phase flip noise in channels AC and BC. Suppose bit flip (3) acts with probability p and phase flip (4) with probability q. The combined action of the error is given by
Equation (8) gives the total action of noise on each channel. Let the length of C T and C T be n, then
Hence the protocol [19] is robust against phase flip but not bit flip noise. For large n and small p, the error is linear in p.
We see that due to depolarizing noise and bit flip noise in the communication channels between Alice (Bob) and Charlie, the protocol returns incorrect results. This is because noise alters the quantum state being sent and consequently the string R A and R B . This alteration results in C T (the string with Charlie) becoming an unfaithful record of the correlations between R A and R B . In general channels are noisy and any protocol fit for implementation must be robust against noise. Hence we need to design protocols that work even under noisy conditions.
III. CSS CODE BASED PROTOCOL
In order to perform three-party QPC under noise it is necessary to preserve the information encoded in the quantum states being sent by Charlie to Alice (Bob). This will ensure that C T remains a faithful record of the correlations. One way to achieve this, is through error correction on the quantum states being sent to convey R A and R B . We utilize CSS codes to perform error correction [22] . We note that these codes have a deep connection with QKD [21] .
We propose a protocol for QPC that is robust under noise and completely secure from attacks. The basic idea is to use the CSS codes to securely transfer a known key from Charlie to Alice and Bob. This allows the QPC to work perfectly under noise as long as the bit (phase) error rate is under an acceptable limit.
A. CSS Codes
We review the CSS codes [22, 23] and the protocol for using CSS codes to perform a secure key distribution of a known random key.
Suppose C 1 and C 2 are [n,
quantum error correcting code capable of correcting t qubit errors. For x ∈ C 1 we define a code state
where ⊕ is summation modulo 2. If x, x belong to the same coset in C 2 i.e. x − x = y ∈ C 2 then they define the same code state, hence the total number of distinct code states is the number of cosets of C 2 in C 1 , |C 1 |/|C 2 | = 2 k1−k2 . Each code state can be used to encode a distinct n bit classical string. This can then be exchanged between interested parties. The code state can get affected by noise in the channel, which we must be able to correct. It is sufficient to write the corrupted code state as 1
Where e 1 is the n bit string with a non-zero entry only at positions where a bit flip has occurred and e 2 is a similar n bit string for phase flips. By correcting both these kind of errors we can correct any kind of error [22, 23] . In order to detect and correct errors we consider σ a(k) the Pauli matrix acting on the k th bit, where a(k) ∈ {x, y, z}. The
a is defined as
l is an n bit string and its i th entry is l i that takes values from {0, 1}. By definition σ 0 a(k) = I. Note that eigenvalues of σ a(k) are ±1.
In classical error correction if F is a parity check matrix for a code M , an error y affecting the code word p giving p = p+y has syndrome F p = F y (F p = 0 by definition). This syndrome is used to determine the most likely error y. Note that the m th entry of the column vector F y is f m · p mod 2, where f m is the m th row in F . For correcting the quantum state in Equation (11), we employ a measurement protocol along similar lines. Let H 1 be the parity check matrix for C 1 and H 2 for C T 2 (the dual code of C 2 ). If l is the i th row of H 1 then we determine the i th column entry for the bit flip error syndrome H 1 · e 1 by measuring σ [l] z with the understanding that the eigenvalue 1(−1) is mapped to 0(1). This way by measuring σ [l] z for each row l ∈ H 1 we obtain the full syndrome. The i th column entry for the phase flip error syndrome H 2 · e 2 is similarly obtained by measuring σ [l ] x where l is the i th row of H 2 . From these syndromes we can accurately get back e 1 and e 2 using classical linear coding theory as long as wt(e 1 ) ≤ t and wt(e 2 ) ≤ t respectively. We then correct the corrupted state and retrieve the encoded state 1
A generalized CSS(C 1 , C 2 ) code for any two n-bit strings x and z can be defined as
We may use these code states. Let s ≡ (x, z) then we denote the quantum code with the above code states as Q s . For x = 0 and z = 0 Q s reduced to CSS(C 1 , C 2 ). If we measure σ
z (l ∈ H 1 ) and σ l x (l ∈ H 2 ) on code state (14) then we will obtain syndromes corresponding to H 1 x and H 2 z respectively. If there was a bit flip error e 1 and a phase flip error e 2 on the code state (14) then our syndrome measurements would be corresponding to H 1 (x + e 1 ) and H 2 (z + e 2 ). We can recover the error with the understanding that we must subtract x and z to retrieve the e 1 and e 2 respectively. If we perform syndrome measurements on any state |ψ and obtain that the syndrome are both null vectors then we can conclude |ψ = |v + C 2 v ∈ C 1 for some v. The syndrome measurement projects the state |ψ into the subspace spanned by |v + C 2 , v ∈ C 1 . Alternatively, if we obtain syndromes corresponding to H 1 .x and H 2 .z for bit and phase flip respectively, then we may conclude that |ψ has been projected into a subspace spanned by code states of Q s , s = (x, z).
B. The Protocol
Let us first describe the CSS based protocol for sharing a known randomly chosen secret key. Let us assume that a secret key is to be distributed between Alice and Charlie.
Protocol 2.
1. Alice creates n random check bits, a random m bit key k and a random 2n bit string b.
2. Alice generates s = (x, z) by choosing n-bit strings x and z at random.
3. Alice encodes her key k as |k using the CSS code Q s .
4. Alice chooses n positions (out of 2n) and puts the check bits in these positions and the code bits in the remaining positions.
5. Alice applies a Hadamard transform to those qubits in those positions where b is 1.
6. Alice sends the resulting state to Charlie. He acknowledges the receipt once he receives all qubits.
7. Alice announces b, the positions of the check bits, the values of the check bits and the strings s.
8. Charlie performs Hadamard on the qubits where b is 1.
9. Charlie checks whether too many of the check bits have been corrupted, and aborts the protocol if so.
10. With the help of s, Charlie decodes the key bits and uses them for the key.
The above protocol works correctly and is unconditionally secure as long as the noise is under a given threshold value [21] . The protocol for carrying out QPC under noisy conditions is as follows Protocol 3.
1. Charlie generates a random n bit string R A and uses the CSS Code based quantum error correction protocol(Protocol 2) to send it to Alice.
2. Charlie generates a random n bit string C T and computes R B = R A ⊕ C T 3. Charlie uses Protocol 2 to send R B to Bob.
Alice and Bob cooperate to compute C
5. Alice and Bob collaborate together to compute C = C A ⊕ C B and send it to Charlie over a public channel.
6. Charlie computes R c = C ⊕ C T . R c has a single non-zero entry if and only if M A = M B , in which case Charlie outputs 1, otherwise he outputs 0
The schematic diagram of the protocol where Charlie generates random strings RA and CT , using the CSS based protocol he sends RA to Alice and RB = RA⊕ CT to Bob over the noisy channels. Alice and Bob encode their respective messages MA and MB in CA and CB. They collaborate to compute C = CA ⊕ CB and send it via a public channel to Charlie.
The entire process is summarized in Figure 1 . It is easy to see that in the absence of noise and eavesdropping the protocol computes the function f (M A , M B ) correctly. In the presence of noise alone the CSS based scheme can transmit keys correctly as long as noise is under an acceptable level (The current acceptable level of bit(phase) flip errors is 20.0% [24, 25] ). When both noise and eavesdropping are allowed the protocol is secure and gives correct results with very high probability. We now show the security and correctness in the presence of noise and eavesdropping. We note that participant attacks are stronger than non-participant attacks since participants always have more information. We consider attacks by Alice and Bob to demonstrate the security of the protocol.
Consider an attack by Alice to gain information about M B . Alice has two fundamentally different kinds to attack. She can attack the transmission channel between Bob and Charlie and try to extract information by performing any physical operation permitted by quantum mechanics. Alternatively she may exploit side channel attacks which exploit loopholes in the devices used to implement key distribution [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] .
Let us first analyze a direct attack on the transmission by Alice. She has access to M A , C B , C A and R A . We may assume that M A contains no information about M B . We note M B = R B ⊕ C B , hence information about R B implies information about M B and vice-versa. Alice can gain information about R B through C T (R B = C T ⊕R A ), alternatively she may intercept the communication between Bob and Charlie. The semi-honest nature of Charlie ensures that Alice does not learn anything about C T . We know [21, 35] that once Bob and Charlie authenticate the CSS protocol the probability that intercepts by Alice go undetected is exponentially close to 1. In the event the protocol is authenticated Alice's mutual information about the key (M B ) is exponentially small. So, any attack by Alice on the communication between Bob and Charlie cannot help her gain more than an exponentially small amount of information about R B without going undetected with a probability exponentially close to 1. So, with very high probability attacks by Alice are unsuccessful.
Consider an attack by Alice on the devices used to implement the CSS based key distribution scheme. A CSS based scheme can be turned into an equivalent modified BB-84 scheme [21] , we need only analyze attacks on the latter to discuss the security of the former. Implementations of QKD employ devices that may not adhere to the strict assumptions made while proving their unconditional security. This allows for side channels for eavesdroppers to attack. These attacks can also be tackled. One can use measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution [36] and appropriate experimental designs [37, 38] to achieve this. In specific it has been shown that we can implement key distribution such that it is immune to all side channel attacks.
In the event the attacks are unsuccessful, then we need only care about the noise. But as we saw earlier the CSS protocol is robust as long as the noise is under an acceptable level. Since the protocol is symmetric with respect to Alice and Bob, any attacks by Bob are also ruled out. We note that Charlie has access to R A , R B , C T and C and is restricted to be semi-honest. It is easy to see that under these restrictions, he can gain no information about M A or M B .
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We analyze EPR based three-party QPC under noisy conditions and show that it is not robust under any amount of bit flip noise and depolarizing noise. We then present a CSS based protocol that is robust against noise and secure under general attacks, as long as the noise is under an acceptable rate.
We note that our protocol no longer uses EPR states, but requires the used of CSS code states. In order to send CSS encoded information we may require multiqubit channels.
In order to perform QPC under noise we exploit the connection between CSS codes and key distribution. This enables us to provide unconditional security for QPC in real time implementation schemes.
It would be interesting to see if other QPC protocols that use d level quantum systems or Greenberger-HorneZeilinger (GHZ) states can also be made unconditionally secure against all possible attacks. Three-party QPC assumes a semi-honest third party. It would be beneficial to explore protocols that work under milder restrictions on the third party.
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